At the end of February, the Russian army repeated a mistake from an earlier phase of the war: in its attempt to capture the eastern Ukrainian city of Wuhledar, the Russian commanders directed their T-64 tanks directly into a Ukrainian ambush, as they had in their attack on the capital Kiev.
Minefields that the Russians had already cleared were rerouted through Ukraine at night using cluster munitions. The moment chaos broke out, Ukrainian artillery and anti-tank teams opened fire. The exact course of the tank battle around Wuhledar was, among other things from the New York Times traced in detail. At least 130 destroyed Russian tanks and armored vehicles ended up stuck in the Ukrainian mud.
Incidents like the one in Wuledar have repeatedly exposed Russia’s tactical and strategic weaknesses in this war. For Western observers, the perception of a decimated, poorly trained troop equipped with mediocre equipment was partially solidified.
Although much of this is true and despite costly mistakes like the one at Wuhledar, Western war observers assume that the Russian army has learned something over the past few months.
“Contrary to the ‘dumb Russians’ stereotype that developed during the war in Ukraine, they have shown their ability to learn and adapt in some areas,” writes ex-Australian general and military expert Mick Ryan in a brief analysis.
This is not irrelevant for Ukraine.
Russia only achieves successes at all in trench warfare
Mainly due to the muddy ground, a stalemate situation has recently set in on the battlefield. With every day that the weather improves, the probability of new offensive operations increases. This applies not only to the widely announced Ukrainian offensive.
“We know that in the spring when the weather improves, and they are already doing so, the Russians want to go on the offensive in some areas,” said the National Security Council’s White House communications director, John Kirby, in an interview with the channel “France24” this week.
Compared to the beginning of the war, the Russian army leadership has apparently changed their minds. “She has learned that her troops can only be successful at all if they force a trench warfare on the mobile Ukrainian units,” says Markus Reisner, colonel in the Austrian Armed Forces, in an interview with the Tagesspiegel.
The initial idea of more complex and large-scale maneuvers – for example with airborne troops and troops advancing on the ground – has now been abandoned. Instead, the Russian army leadership, due to its numerical superiority, is driving concentrated waves of soldiers toward Ukrainian positions.
“This is a more sophisticated adaptation of ‘human wave’ tactics,” writes ex-General Ryan, in which the initial human waves are only the first squadron of several, with each subsequent squadron being composed of more experienced and capable troops.
The aim is to squeeze small territorial gains from the Ukrainians bit by bit and possibly force a breakthrough in the defensive positions. Apparently, the training of new shock troops to overturn the Ukrainian bases should also help.
The use of longer-range missiles also counts as a tactical adjustment by the Russian army. At the beginning of April, a representative of the Ukrainian air defense said that Russia was dropping up to 20 guided bombs a day, including so-called glide bombsaimed at Ukrainian positions.
These would be fired by the Russian Su-35 and Su-34 jets outside of the range of the Ukrainian air defense system and would fly towards their targets at high speed with almost no noise. This is a threat “to which we urgently need to respond”.
However: As is so often the case with war equipment, it is all about the quantity in which it is available. Experts doubt that Russia can mass-produce modern missile systems. It is also still unclear how many missiles Russia still has, after it has probably decimated its stocks through several weeks of continuous fire.
Russia has learned from past Ukrainian offensives
Russia has also learned something new in securing its conquered territories. The Ukraine was able to achieve its successes on the offensive last year mainly because the Russian troops had previously exhausted themselves and were no longer able to adequately secure the conquered territory with its kilometer-long front.
Once they had broken through, the Ukrainian troops hardly met any resistance for miles, which resulted in large gains in territory within a very short time. That’s different now. Especially in the south, in the area between Zaporizhia and Melitopol, Russia has massively expanded its defenses. The land corridor is generally considered to be suitable for a Ukrainian counter-offensive, because the Russian troops could be divided up in this way and it would then hardly be possible for Russia to supply the annexed Crimea.
On the one-to-two-kilometer front sections, Russian defenses typically consist of a minefield followed by a series of pyramid-shaped concrete bollards known as “dragon’s teeth”. They are primarily intended to prevent tanks from advancing. Another minefield follows. 400 meters behind are the trenches. Finally, another anti-tank ditch is intended to make an enemy offensive more difficult.
Several experts believe that in some parts of the south Russia has arranged up to three such defense lines in a row at a distance of tens of kilometers.
Weapon systems and information speak for Ukraine
But how can Ukraine react to the adjustments made by Russia?
The overriding goal for Kiev’s troops will be to quickly advance in depth from the west with its new main battle tanks in order to outflank the enemy’s reserves. “At best, the positional war then becomes a war of movement, in which the more mobile Ukrainian units can fully exploit their advantages,” says Colonel Reisner.
He believes that for the success of the Ukrainian offensive it will be crucial to cover up the main thrust of the attack with minor diversionary maneuvers for as long as possible, thus getting the Russian reserves to rotate. And what about the reinforced defenses?
The Ukraine will not be able to avoid major losses in the event of a possible capture. By refusing to supply fighter jets, the West is forcing Ukraine to “fight the hard way,” says Philips O’Brien, the military historian and professor of strategic studies at St Andrews University in Scotland.
Translated, this means: Every minefield has to be cleared individually, every trench has to be stormed. There are two main factors that speak in favor of Ukraine. While Russia is gradually having to fall back on older and older military equipment – recently there have even been reports of the possible use of tanks from the 1940s and 1950s – the Ukrainian army is being equipped with modern weapon systems from the West. As the war progresses, this asymmetry becomes more and more evident.
And Ukraine will know exactly when and where to play their superiority on their offensive. Despite the documents that have now been leaked, Kiev still has an immense information advantage. It is now well-documented to what extent US intelligence informs its Ukrainian counterparts in near real-time about actions and movements on the Russian side.
“So the moment the offensive begins, you can be sure that the US will have identified and reported the weaknesses in the Russians’ defensive positions,” says Colonel Reisner.
