Since the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian army has been praised for its courage in resisting the Russian invaders. Their combined military strength to withstand and push back the attackers from Moscow has surprised the international community and the Russian government. But the Ukrainian soldiers are also suffering from the exhausting war, which, according to American estimates, has cost the lives of more than 100,000 of them. “The military is bleeding,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Zaluzhnyi recently told The Economist.
Military strategist: The Ukrainian army must improve this
In a detailed analysis, British military strategist Glen Grant now recommends that the losses in the war, which has been going on for more than 13 months, should make the Ukrainian military leadership reconsider. It needs to move away from Soviet methods and towards NATO practices, said Grant, who in 2014 was an adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister at the time. On ”
EuromaidanPress
‘ the former colonel breaks down the Ukrainian army’s biggest weaknesses – and what it needs to change if it wants to remain steadfast. Because the war, according to Grant, “could easily last two to four years”.
1. The military culture
The Ukrainian military lacks a “one-army concept,” says Grant. He explains: The Ukrainian army is growing every day and new soldiers are joining it. Many of them have little or no military experience. The army today is no longer what it was before February 24, 2022, Grant points out. That’s why hierarchies have to become flatter. Because currently there is often a structural “arrogance”, a gap in the units – between commanders and inexperienced soldiers, according to Grant.
But if the army were to become even more “civilian” in the future, long-established structures would no longer be tolerated by everyone. Another point: while many commanders still follow Soviet methods, others are approaching them more and more like Western military strategies. Ukraine needs more consistency to last, Grant said. This also means that soldiers are trained according to the same standards. So that those soldiers who were not adequately prepared do not die prematurely.
2.
The geographic command boundaries
Each unit must have clear geographic boundaries that aren’t too narrow, Grant says. But that is not always the case at the moment. According to Grant, Ukrainian battalions cross the borders of others without first communicating, which sometimes leads to fatalities in their own ranks. In Soledar, for example, foreign battalions mingled with the existing brigades without consulting the commanders.
Again and again it happened that, in addition to the soldiers, the secret service (GUR), special forces (SOF) or security service (SBU) operated in the same area without consulting each other. That would greatly increase the risk of failure. “So commanders can’t be certain that their units have the authority to fire, fly drones across borders, maneuver, advance or retreat,” Grant explains. That would quickly lead to “hasty orders from stressed-out commanders.”
3. The commander level
Ukraine therefore lacks a unified system, a common military culture and clear geographical borders. But the quality of the commanders is also not uniform, says Grant. So he recommends that the best of all commanders should be the sole commanders in an area. An example: In Bakhmut, where there are many brigades, there should be one commander who communicates between the brigades and the regional headquarters – and not one for each brigade. That would simplify the command structures in complex combat zones in one fell swoop, Grant said.
But this also requires a tough division into qualified and less qualified commanders, Grant demands. And that is currently still unbalanced, he observes within the Ukrainian military. This also affects the interaction between commanders and those who are on the battlefield. Because the NATO standard says: The commander who is really involved in the fighting is “king”. And that requires one thing above all: trust.
“Those who are unable to lead from the front lines and who issue unprofessional orders that cause heavy casualties and do not reflect the truth on the ground should be quickly transferred to other duties. They are not the commanders Ukraine needs to win this war.”
4. The bureaucracy
Because the Soviet military structure is considered to be extremely bureaucratic, the Ukrainian army leadership also gets lost in rules and processes. Grant explains this with an example: The need for drones was great, Ukraine ordered an important contingent from abroad. But it took four weeks for the drones to arrive at the military – only because the signature from the Ministry of Defense was still missing. “This delay meant soldiers died due to a lack of drones,” Grant said.
It would be similar for the domestic manufacture of military goods. Grant demands: Important documents and laws must be rewritten for the war. “The critical responsibility to do the right thing to save lives must take precedence over the need to follow paper rules,” Grant said.
5. The training
“War is the best education, but it also takes blood,” Grant says. The training of the soldiers must be significantly better, he recommends. Especially if one assumes that the war could continue for a few more years, new soldiers would have to receive the same basic training all the time. “The principle must be that no one goes to war without proper training,” Grant said.
“The basic training of Ukrainian infantry soldiers today is limited and far inferior to that of any Western country. It is much less than what soldiers received in previous wars”. He criticizes that units are not currently being trained together. Above all, it needs international support, training according to NATO standards.
