Analysis by Thomas Jäger – Germany draws the wrong conclusions from Putin’s invasion

In Ukraine, the expected Russian offensive is beginning, and one question is whether the arms, ammunition and training support for the Ukrainian armed forces has been sufficient and timely to withstand these attacks.

Especially with regard to the behavior of the federal government, the question arises as to why decisions are always poorly prepared or deliberately delayed.

The repair of the stored tanks could have started as early as eleven months ago in order to be able to act at some point, provided that a corresponding decision is made.

Citizens should also have a battery-operated radio ready in case it is needed. And that tanks will be needed in Ukraine was more likely.

However, this indecisive action by the federal government builds on the approaches of previous governments. The question is whether it will still be possible to implement the approach of the turning point before it frays, as some would like. A look at Russia and China shows how urgently this is needed.

Despite heavy losses, Russia will not give up

Immensely high losses, the number of fallen Russian soldiers is now estimated at 200,000, and operational defeats that Russia suffered last year do not prevent the Russian leadership from continuing to pursue its war goals in Ukraine with all available means .

Russia does not want to “see” (Scholz) that it will end the war. On the contrary, Russia wants to occupy at least part of Ukraine’s territory in order to advance further west from there at a later date and ultimately take complete possession of Ukraine. According to all observations, the country is currently not in a position to do this.

But that doesn’t mean that the goal of dominating all of Ukraine has been abandoned. On the contrary. In Russian discourse, the pursuit of dominance in Europe is now even associated with the liberation of the GDR from fascists.

This propaganda volt is good for biting comments in this country, after all, the AfD is particularly strong in the eastern German states, but should be taken seriously with a view to the orientation behind it.

greed for domination

Finally, the influence of the Soviet Union, of which Russia sees itself as its successor, reached as far as Suhl, Eisenach and Schwerin. Russia is suffering after the collapse of the Soviet empire, which many saw as the last on European soil.

Not under post-imperial phantom pain, but under an acute greed for rule: directly via the successor states of the Soviet Union, indirectly via the states of Eastern Europe, which have already suffered this fate, and towards Western and Southern Europe, because their helplessness can be exploited. As soon as the US turns its back on Europe, Russia wants to dominate the continent.

This is not an unlikely calculation, because in the US China is seen as the key challenge to dominance in international relations.

China wants to challenge the US and can. Russia would like to, but cannot and will not be able to for decades. That is why the USA – contrary to a common, fact-free “opinion” – had no interest whatsoever in the attack of February 24, 2022. On the contrary.

Months earlier, the United States had informed the Chinese government that Russia was making all preparations for war in order to jointly prevent the attack. China didn’t go along, for whatever reason. Perhaps the leadership in Beijing thought the same as the political elite in Moscow: a short and victorious war would be waged.

evaluation of the war

That’s what governments like to expect before the order to attack is given. The Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the USA in Iraq, Russia in Ukraine: the war will be short and successful and will strengthen your own state.

Otherwise the order would not be issued. But – as the three examples show – things often turn out differently. Already, Russia’s war against Ukraine is consuming more resources than it brings to Russia.

This is a fundamental evaluation of wars: if they bring the aggressor more than they cost, the decision was correct. Otherwise not. This even applies to political systems such as those in Russia and China, which now place crude ideologies above economic rationality.

What conclusion will China draw?

That is why it is so difficult to predict what conclusions China will draw from Russia’s war against Ukraine. In principle, two insights are possible.

First, that it is more difficult than expected to defeat a supposedly weaker opponent militarily if it is supported by other states, above all by the world’s largest military power, the USA.

The conclusion would then be to desist from the war against Taiwan and rely on time playing in the People’s Republic’s favour: economic dependency, international isolation, disinformation, all effective means that, however, do not promise rapid success. Military attacks, however, can only rarely deliver this, even if this is expected of them.

Second, the leadership in Beijing could conclude that Russia implemented the campaign in a clumsy and unsuccessful manner and that under slightly different circumstances Kyiv really would have fallen after a week.

Then every week of delay would only mean that Taiwan and possible supporters would be better prepared for the attack by the People’s Republic. Rapid action would then promise greater success.

Only Washington draws conclusions from Russia’s invasion

However this dual challenge from Russia and China develops, so far the impression remains that only Washington understood what conclusions to draw from it.

The own training, armaments to support allies and a clear strategy against the belligerent Russia and the apparently warlike China.

In Berlin, some of the government factions still seem to be shrouded in the thought that the declaration of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is the best protection against nuclear weapons.

The concept of deterrence is hardly considered. The turning point has therefore only arrived insufficiently in the defense budget. The Bundeswehr itself speaks of palliative measures. This will not change as long as the turning point has not been realized mentally and politically and culturally.

Sleepy defense policy

The federal government is currently only contributing to this, if at all, in homeopathic doses. Is this the right form of therapy in times of war being waged on the European continent? No definitely not.

The result is that after years of Chancellor Schröder trying to alienate Germany from the US, Chancellor Merkel not caring enough about the country’s security, Chancellor Scholz delaying Bundeswehr training even after Russia’s war of aggression, Germany its external security cannot guarantee on their own. It seems as if there is still a lack of a federal government making sustained efforts to ensure the country’s external security.