Liana Fix is an expert on German and European Russia policy and a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington, DC.
Michael Kimage is Professor and Chair of History at the Catholic University of America in Washington, DC.
A year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one thing is clear: the goals that Moscow was still pursuing on the eve of the invasion on February 24, 2022 have become unattainable – both the planned overthrow of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the establishment of a Russian colony .
Thanks to a strong Ukrainian army, a determined government in Kiev and international support for Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin will not be able to hold a victory parade.
The cost of his false war will be paid by generations of Russians. You will live in a country less connected to the outside world, a country forced into an inept military dictatorship and made an accomplice in a criminal war.
But how will this war end? Will Russia lose him slowly or quickly? Will it break or somehow manage to get over defeat? Five Scenarios.
Scenario 1: The path towards negotiations is blocked
Over the past twelve months, it has become increasingly unlikely that the war will end in a Russian victory or in a negotiated solution. Ukraine is unlikely to change course or dwindle in military capabilities anytime soon.
The brutality of the Russian invasion has deprived the country of an opportunity to bet on a diplomatic solution, as Kyiv did in 2014 and again in early 2015 in the “Minsk Accords” negotiations. Even the many countries that support Ukraine are unlikely to press them to accept a negotiated settlement.
The probability that this would only lead to a pause in the war is too great. You can see that in the occupation of Crimea: the fact that the peninsula was given to Putin in 2014 was, so to speak, the precursor to the 2022 invasion.
Russia has so far shown no willingness to consider negotiations without a demand for surrender. Four Ukrainian regions – Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhia – are claimed by Moscow. If Kiev accepts their annexation, it would not only cede areas controlled by Russia – but also areas that have not yet been taken by Moscow.
Putin sees these oblasts as historically Russian, and his FSB secret service is promoting the integration of the occupied territories into the Russian Federation. So asking for peace would mean one thing for Ukraine: sacrificing the very foundations of its nationality. That should be unacceptable for Kyiv.
Scenario 2: Moscow relies on attrition tactics
While Russia is trying to retake territory in the Donbas, it will most likely focus on destroying civilian infrastructure in Ukraine – which, of course, is far less complicated than taking the whole country. Russia has military, cyber and other tools that can be used against Ukraine’s power grid, water supply and transport hubs – in many cases it is already doing so. By damaging and impoverishing Ukraine, Russia wants to test not only Ukraine’s resolve, but also that of Europe and the United States.
An end to Putinism is needed.
Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage
Part of this strategy is psychological in nature, to create the impression over time that the war in Ukraine is persistent, intractable and unstoppable. If Russia is successful with this approach, there will be political consequences. It’s less about withdrawing support from Ukraine. Rather, the willingness to help Ukraine could dwindle in principle.
The other part of the strategy is practical, and it is to make engagement with Ukraine as expensive and difficult as possible in order to trigger further refugee flows and stoke the selfishness of Ukraine’s supporters.
In this scenario, Ukraine would not be defeated. While capable of surviving a long war, it would not arrive in a brighter future in a possible post-war period.
Scenario 3: Ukraine successfully strikes back
A successful counteroffensive this year could bring Russia back to where it was at the start of the war, when it occupied parts of eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Russia would have gained little or no additional territory. It could even lose its position in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
This scenario amounts to an actual defeat for Russia. Ukraine will launch its offensive in the spring and summer – and it can do so with a much more sophisticated arsenal of weapons than at the start of the war. The country has shown an admirable ability to incorporate new technologies into its warfare.
With a successful counteroffensive, Ukraine could even win back Crimea this year.
This could move the Ukrainian military forward in two directions – towards Melitopol and the Black Sea on the one hand, and towards Crimea on the other. These areas will be more difficult for Ukraine to recapture than the Kharkiv and Kherson area, but the Ukrainian military should not be underestimated.
A successful push into Melitopol would drive a wedge between Russian forces to the east and south. It would be a lost war for Russia if it could no longer go on the offensive and its losses were obvious to everyone, especially at home.
Putin has already made the decision to declare four oblasts of Ukraine annexed, although he does not control them fully. The less he can defend these areas, the more shaky he seems as Russia’s leader. Ironically, the annexation of Crimea, which Putin hailed as a stroke of genius, could backfire on Putin if he is unable to defend it.
Scenario 4: Russia fails to exit
Putin will try to cover up Russia’s true position in Ukraine. No country likes to admit military defeat. Even democracies like the United States have found it difficult to accept losing wars, and Putin’s Russia is not a democracy. He built his reputation as a Russian leader on the motif of restored Russia, reconciling narratives of military glory of the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union. In doing so, he involved government and society in commemorating the Second World War.
While Russia was slowly becoming a dictatorship, Putin cultivated the image of military power. His propaganda apparatus is designed in such a way that he can continue to cultivate this image even as the army marches from one debacle to the next. As a dictator, he will continue his war as long as possible.
The Russian elite threatens to split as a result of the war and turn against Putin.
This scenario is somewhat surreal: it means that the country loses a war without acknowledging the loss. It may seem that this scenario is limited to Russia’s domestic political debate. However, this is not the case. The consequence would be an almost limitless willingness on the part of Russia to continue fighting this war.
So, because the Kremlin controls the war narrative, no single turn on the battlefield would quickly end the war. Russia would wage war against itself, but many of the victims would be Ukrainians. That would leave it in the unenviable position of continuing a war it can hardly win.
Scenario 5: Putin loses power
If this state of affairs cannot be hushed up, if Putin’s folly ultimately becomes a national folly for all Russians, then his position of power will falter. The danger that threatens Putin is not a popular uprising. He shielded the Kremlin too rigorously for that. The danger he faces is a split within the Russian elite caused by the wrong war at the wrong time.
Elites – both inside and outside the military – would then have incentives to turn against Putin, and the war itself has spawned independent militias within Russia. Putin has established a system of rule in Russia that will not be easily overthrown.
But dictatorial power always seems unassailable until it is actually called into question. And nothing so invites such challenges as the turmoil of war. Radical wars often have radical consequences. For the past few months, Russia has been at a strange standstill. In many respects, life went on as before, without major protests, without any significant changes in the regime.
Twelve months, almost without any politics. But that won’t last forever. As in the Crimean War in the 1850s, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the First World War in 1917 and the Afghan War in the late 1980s, Russia could find itself a different country after the Ukraine War. The American journalist John Reed called the Bolshevik Revolution “ten days that shook the world”.
Putin’s unwanted departure from power would be a no less earth-shattering turn of events. For Ukraine, even this scenario does not necessarily mean the end of the war. Any Russian government formed after Putin’s rule ends will have a hard time reversing his war. To do that, you have to admit defeat.
Normalizing relations with Ukraine, Europe and the United States would imperatively require reparations from and war crimes tribunals for Russia. Even for a possible moderate successor to Vladimir Putin, these concessions would be very difficult. War may bring Putin’s end, but it will not be enough to end the war. An end to the war will require an end to Putinism.
