Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to South Africa on Monday marks the start of his second tour of Africa in less than a year. On his trip in July last year, he mainly visited African countries that have a bad relationship with the West.
Theodore Murphy is the director of the Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank specializing in European foreign policy.
Lavrov’s encouraging message to these leaders was that Russia represents an alternative that accepts them as they are – devoid of Western claims to democracy or human rights – and that Russia would never demand, as Lavrov accused the West, that Africa commit to a side must decide.
In fact, last year the West urged the 54 African states at the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Many African leaders, however, carried over the Cold War non-aligned argument – underlining that Africa’s difficult economic situation made it necessary to maintain good relations with all sides. Cooperation with Lavrov over the past year was at the same time a reaffirmation of these principles.
But Moscow’s senior diplomat is unlikely to have an easy time of it this time as he travels to the continent to promote July’s Russia-Africa summit. Since his last visit, Europe, the US and like-minded allies have upped the ante – and Russia has not been able to keep up.
Africa wants a seat on the UN Security Council
African leaders have long wanted G20 membership and one or more permanent seats for Africa on the United Nations Security Council. These demands were endorsed by US President Joe Biden in September, and later by current Security Council member states. The foreign ministers of Germany and France also spoke out in favor of this during their joint visit to Ethiopia.
This growing momentum towards greater African representation is a blow to Russian arguments of an unjust world order and the need for an alternative, namely in the form of the Russian-Chinese-driven BRICS format, a union of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa . The new dynamic is forcing Russia and China from rhetorical support for a vote for the Global South to a concrete stance on an African seat on the Security Council – threatening to expose the emptiness of Russia’s and China’s rhetoric.
Russia and China do not support a seat for Africa
At the key UN Security Council session in October, chaired by Gabon, Russia and China flatly refused to support an African seat; During the visit of the new Chinese foreign minister to Africa in January, China again avoided a clear position in a final press statement.
As the campaign for a seat on the Security Council gathers momentum, support for it becomes the litmus test of the partnership with Africa. This is hampering Russia’s ability to achieve its goals at this year’s Russia-Africa summit. Russia’s offers in a partnership usually consist of arms and Wagner militia, agricultural commodities, and a blanket promise of using Russia’s veto in the Security Council. However, even without the new focus on a seat for Africa on the Security Council, these offers are becoming increasingly unattractive.
Russia’s offer to veto African allies on the Security Council is worthless when those same allies could have their own seat at the table.
Theodore Murphy
The questionable services provided by the Wagner mercenaries appeal only to Africa’s backward autocrats. Providing much-needed wheat, fertilizer and cooking oil – which are in short supply due to Russian aggression – is a case of the arsonist showing up to put out his own fire. Moreover, suggestions by Russia that it would use its veto in the Security Council to help allies in Africa are worthless when those same allies could have their own seat at the table.
African states that are neutral in the Ukraine conflict point to the devastation that the Cold War wreaked on Africa. But the changes in world order since then seem to show that the new situation isn’t just bad for Africa.
A bigger role for Africa also raises questions
However, a possible larger role for Africa in the global order also raises questions. In the case of the Russian attack on Ukraine, there has been a partial refusal to support the principles of the global order, giving the impression of seeking a greater share of the world order while at the same time abstaining from responsibility.
To address this problem, African leaders could take a position on the global order at the Russia-Africa summit – and draw Russia out on the question of a seat on the Security Council.
Some African leaders are in a vulnerable position, making it difficult to rock the boat with Russia – or China. Influential African states that are less dependent on Russia should therefore put this item on the agenda of the summit and try to influence the African Union (AU).
The route via the AU would give the position an official character, strengthen the pan-African claim and protect the more exposed states. Framed in the principles of the African Union, which are in line with those of the world order, a positioning of the AU in the run-up to the summit would both reaffirm the centrality of its principles for Africa and underline its willingness to assume greater global responsibility.
