It’s not been two weeks since I was writing here that difficult times are coming for Ukraine in its relationship with Poland, and here it is that the trouble has heated up in the last few days with statements regarding the cessation of arms deliveries (declarations first thrown warlikely, then turned around, styled and put under the rug), mutual stings at the level high at the UN and Warsaw, summons of ambassadors for eavesdropping, etc. All against the backdrop of the Ukrainian grain transport crisis, which for Poland presents a much greater challenge than for Romania, for example.
Sorin IonitaPhoto: Personal archive
Obviously, the cause of this seeming sudden, but actually smoldering since the beginning of 2023, is the parliamentary elections in Poland next month, which will give a new government. And things are on a knife edge because of the rise of the Polish AUR party, called the Confederation. After how much the topic, generally parochial, has been commented on here as well, there is no better time to listen to a real expert in Polish-Ukrainian relations: Piotr Buras, Senior Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the head of their office in Warsaw. Because this topic somehow involves us and the mess will not end with the elections, as Buras says. Text below.
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Polish-Ukrainian relations became hostage in the Polish election campaign. Competition between the national conservative ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party and the far-right Konfederacja party for the votes of nationalist and anti-Ukrainian voters is damaging Poland’s image as an unequivocal supporter of Ukraine and risks damaging bilateral relations.
Warsaw’s military support for Ukraine will not change substantially after Morawiecki’s statement (the one with the stoppage of arms deliveries, NT). The decrease in deliveries is not due to a lack of political will, but in fact to the depletion of Polish resources. Morawiecki’s statement, which emphasized the need to invest in national defense rather than focus on supporting Ukraine, was aimed primarily at a domestic audience that has become skeptical of Ukraine due to recent controversies over grain imports and historical disputes. However, it does a great disservice to the Ukrainian cause, as this narrative parallels and legitimizes those voices in Europe (mainly from the extreme right) that question the need to supply arms to Ukraine.
Poland’s growing nervousness in its relations with Ukraine will not go away after the October 15 parliamentary elections. In Poland, “after the elections” also means “before the elections”. The electoral campaign will continue, as the formation of the government will be difficult and we cannot rule out early elections in the spring of 2024. The European elections in 2024 and the presidential elections in 2025 will also influence a political debate in which the breakdown of the consensus on support for Ukraine will play a role important.
The dispute with Ukraine is proof of Poland’s self-marginalization in the EU. Kiev seems to pay less attention to relations with Warsaw today and is ready to sacrifice them, not least because Warsaw’s influence in the EU as a supporter of Ukraine has diminished. In view of the upcoming debate on EU reform, enlargement and reconstruction, Ukraine has reoriented itself towards those countries that matter most in the EU: Germany and France. Poland is less useful to Kiev today than in the past. –Read the entire article and comment on contributors.ro
