Taiwan will hold presidential and legislative elections on January 13. They are of great importance to the stability of relations between China and the United States amid the current strategic competition between the two great powers. Whoever becomes Taiwan’s next president will have great influence over China’s geopolitical ambitions in the region and in mediating China-U.S. relations.
Who are the candidates for the presidency of Taiwan? The presidential campaign is a three-way race defined primarily by the candidates’ position on cross-Strait relations, that is, what Taiwan’s position should be between China and the United States. On the one hand, the nationalist Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), in power for 8 years; on the other, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), more friendly to Beijing; and, thirdly, that of the new populist party, the People’s Party of Taiwan (PPT), more focused on channeling internal grievances and strategically more ambiguous about policy towards China.
Electoral trends suggest a divided electorate. At the moment, the ruling party, the DPP, appears favorite to win the presidency by a narrow margin; the KMT remains at a safe distance and may still have a chance, especially if it plays its cards well in the final days, while the TPP has the potential to become the decisive vote in the next legislature.
Whoever wins, post-election Taiwan will most likely have a new president with an electorally weaker mandate and will be constrained by an opposition-held legislature. It will be a very different situation from the last elections in 2020, when the DPP was re-elected with 57% of the presidential votes and a solid legislative majority.
From an electoral point of view, China policy is usually the most important factor in deciding presidential elections, and in this regard the two main political parties present very different visions. A KMT victory would strategically imply calmer relations between Taiwan and China, but could sow doubt between Taipei and Washington.
Taiwan’s relations with Beijing and Washington are often a zero-sum game. Ties between the United States and Taiwan have seen significant progress in recent years, including in areas of security cooperation. Should a KMT government decide to warm relations with Beijing, it will have to handle it with great wisdom and delicacy to avoid a cooling of US-Taiwan ties.
Economically, the KMT promises to accelerate ties with China, even though many of Taiwan’s trading partners are diversifying or “de-branding” the Chinese economy. KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih has also promised to revive the 2013 Cross-Strait Trade and Services Agreement (CSSTA), a trade deal that was intended to bring the two economies closer but was met with with waves of protests by Taiwanese society and was finally not ratified by the legislative assembly.
Regarding people-to-people interaction, the KMT is also committed to exploring the possibility of opening the Taiwanese labor market to workers from the People’s Republic, both in the name of economic liberalization and creating goodwill on both sides. of the Strait.
On the contrary, if the DPP wins, it will most likely receive even more pressure from China. Beijing has repeatedly criticized the DPP’s candidate, current Vice President Lai Ching-te, by name, leaving the DPP with few ways to save face. Among other things, when Lai visited the United States in August 2023, he called it “blatant exploitation of US-Taiwan ties to pursue independence.” de jure“.
More economic sanctions against Taiwan are also likely to be imposed if the DPP wins. Song Tao, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, framed the Taiwan elections as a choice not only between “peace or war” but also between “prosperity or recession.” As part of that economic offensive, China has already suspended some preferential tariff treatment for some Taiwanese exports to the People’s Republic of China, possibly as a way to discourage Taiwanese voters from voting for the DPP.
The preemptive punishment against the DPP has also manifested itself in increased Chinese military activity in the waters and in the air around Taiwan. If the DPP wins, there is every reason to expect that these provocative Chinese military operations of Gray zone continue, and even intensify.
The risks of military escalation are increasing daily, especially as China appears determined to continue escalating its military maneuvers near Taiwan, forcing the United States and other countries to launch their own overflight operations in the vicinity, making accidents more likely. And not just an accidental escalation: as Beijing boycotts official communication channels with the DPP government, the absence of contact makes an escalation even more likely.
Convincing Beijing to tone down its coercive campaign and help stabilize peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait will depend on Taiwanese political parties achieving convincing victories in the upcoming elections, whether the DPP or the KMT. A resounding DPP victory would allow Taiwan to negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength. It would also break Taiwan’s infamous “eight-year curse”, becoming the first party to win three consecutive terms in Taiwan’s democratic era.
This could finally convince Beijing that the DPP is here to stay and that Chinese attempts to undermine it are futile. In turn, this could give Beijing more incentives to show greater flexibility and goodwill towards the DPP, in the hope of breaking the deadlock. However, if the DPP narrowly wins the presidency and fails to maintain a majority in the legislative assembly, Beijing will have little incentive to show goodwill to the DPP, and tensions will remain high.
On the other hand, a resounding victory for the KMT would give it a stronger domestic mandate to press ahead with its agenda of economic engagement with its neighbor. This means that the KMT could negotiate better terms with Beijing and that any agreement it signs with Beijing would have a better chance of being accepted and ratified by the Taiwanese and the legislature.
In summary, Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections are of great importance to the overall stability of US-China relations and the cohesion of the Indo-Pacific regional alignment. The solution to regional instability is twofold: Taiwanese voters have to give their next government a convincing victory to strengthen its position at the negotiating table, and Beijing has to bet on moderation and pragmatism to pursue its objectives regarding to Taiwan by peaceful rather than military means.
