The regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin is on borrowed time. The course of history is changing, and from Ukraine’s advances on the battlefield to the unity and unwavering resolve of the West in the face of Russian aggression, everything points to 2023 will be a decisive year. If the West holds firm, Putin’s regime will likely collapse in the near future.
Yet some of Ukraine’s main partners remain reluctant to provide kyiv with the weapons it needs to deliver the final blow. US President Joe Biden’s administration, in particular, appears to be concerned that an emphatic defeat by the Kremlin will lead to chaos. She refused to send the tanks, long-range missile systems and drones that would allow Ukrainian forces to fight their aggressors, reclaim their territory and end the war. The end of Putin’s tyrannical rule will indeed dramatically change Russia (and the rest of the world), but not in the way the White House thinks. Instead of destabilizing Russia and its neighbors, a Ukrainian victory would eliminate a powerful repressive force and strengthen the cause of democracy around the world.
Pro-democracy Russians who reject Putin’s totalitarian regime – a group to which the authors of this text belong – are doing what they can to help Ukraine liberate all occupied territories and restore its territorial integrity in accordance with internationally recognized borders since 1991. We are also preparing for the post-Putin era. The Russian Action Committee, a coalition of opposition groups in exile that we co-founded in May 2022, aims to ensure that Ukraine receives just compensation for the damage caused by Putin’s aggression, that all war criminals are held accountable, but also that Russia goes from a rogue dictatorship to a federal parliamentary republic. In other words, we should not fear the imminent end of Putin’s rule, but welcome it with open arms.
The efforts of the latter to restore the Russian empire are doomed to failure. The time is therefore ripe for a transition to democracy and a decentralization of power to regional levels. But for such a political transformation to take place, Putin must be defeated militarily in Ukraine. A decisive defeat on the battlefield would shake his myth of invincibility. It would expose him as the architect responsible for the failure of the state, which would make his regime vulnerable to a challenge from within.
The West, and especially the United States, is able to provide the military and financial support needed to hasten the inevitable and propel Ukraine to a quick victory. But the Biden administration has still not come to a clear agreement on the outcome of this war, and some US officials have suggested that kyiv should consider ceding some of its territory for peace – suggestions that are not not reassuring. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has made it clear that the Ukrainian people will never accept such an agreement. Any territorial concession made to Putin will inevitably lead to a new war.
At the root of Washington’s reluctance to supply the necessary weapons is fear of the consequences that a decisive Russian defeat in Ukraine might entail. Many within the Biden administration believe Putin’s fall could trigger Russia’s collapse, throwing the nuclear-armed state into chaos and potentially strengthening China.
But these fears are excessive. The risk of a Russian collapse is obviously real. But it matters more with Putin in office — pushing the country in an ever more centralized and militarized direction — than under democratic, federal rule. The longer the current regime remains in power, the greater the risk of an unpredictable breakdown. Putin’s aggression revealed the inherent instability of his model of government, based on the need to oppose foreign enemies. The Kremlin mafia, which has turned Russia into a playground for its military plans, has already threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It is therefore not the fall of the Putin regime that Washington should fear, but its survival.
For almost two decades, some Western pundits claimed that Russians would never accept democracy and that Russia was doomed to “revanchism”. In fact, Putin’s propaganda succeeded in disseminating to a significant part of the Russian population the idea that Western values were entirely foreign to Russia. But economic integration with the West has enabled other countries to overcome their fascist heritage. And deeper integration with Europe, coupled with conditional relief from Western sanctions, could help Russia do the same.
In the wake of Putin’s military defeat, Russia would have to choose: to become a vassal of China or to begin its reintegration within Europe (after having rightly compensated Ukraine for the damages inflicted during the conflict, and punish those guilty of war crimes). For the majority of Russians, the choice of peace, freedom and prosperity would be obvious – and would be made even more so by the rapid reconstruction of Ukraine.
Putin’s military defeat would help catalyze a political transformation of Russia, allowing those seeking a better future to dismantle the old regime and build a new political model. The Russian Action Committee presented a plan for this transformation, with a view to restoring the Russian regime “on the principles of the rule of law, federalism, parliamentarism, a clear separation of powers and the priority given to the rights of rights and freedoms over the abstract “interests of the state”. We envisage that Russia will become a parliamentary republic and a federal state with, for the central power, limited powers (those necessary for the conduct of foreign and defense policy, and the protection of citizens’ rights) and regional governments much stronger.
It will take time. Within two years of the dissolution of Putin’s regime, Russians would elect a constituent assembly to adopt a new constitution and determine a new system of regional governments. But in the short term, before that assembly sits, a transitional state council, with legislative powers, would be needed to oversee a temporary technocratic government. Its core would be made up of Russians committed to the rule of law, those who have publicly disavowed the war waged by Putin and his illegitimate regime. Most have been forced into exile, where we have the freedom to organize and create a virtual civil society in absentia. Such preparations will allow us to act quickly and work with Western powers, which the new Russian government will need to stabilize the economy.
Immediately after coming to power, the State Council will conclude a peace agreement with Ukraine, recognizing its 1991 borders and offering it fair compensation for the damage caused by Putin’s war. The State Council will officially reject the imperial policies of the Putin regime, both in Russia and abroad, notably ceasing all formal or informal support for pro-Russian entities in the countries of the former Soviet Union. It will also end Russia’s longstanding confrontation with the West, shifting instead to a foreign policy based on peace, partnership and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Domestically, the Council of State will begin to demilitarize Russia by reducing the size of the armed forces and, by extension, the cost of maintaining them. He will also dissolve the organs of Putin’s police state, including the repressive Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Center for Countering Extremism, and repeal all repressive laws passed during Putin’s rule. All political prisoners will be released and fully rehabilitated, and a broader amnesty program will be adopted to reduce the number of prisoners in Russia.
At the federal level, the Council of State will pursue lustration, by carrying out open and thorough investigations into former officials, in order to exclude those responsible for the abuses of the previous regime. Furthermore, he will liquidate all political parties and public organizations that supported the invasion of Ukraine, so that these cannot interfere with the building of a new Russia. At the same time, the council will liberalize election rules, simplify political party registration procedures, and remove Putin’s restrictions on rallies, strikes and demonstrations.
The Council of State will also begin the process of decentralization of the country, by transferring broad powers to the regions, including in budgetary matters. Such reforms will weaken the all-powerful imperial center of Russia: if the federal government does not have absolute control of state finances, it will not have the means to carry out military adventures.
Finally, the council will hold war criminals and senior officials of Putin’s regime to account. Those responsible for the worst war crimes will be judged by an international tribunal, and Russia will judge the others. To do this, it will have to draw a clear distinction between war criminals and agents of the former regime, proposing various forms of compromise with the latter to better ensure a peaceful transition.
This is a defining moment for Ukraine. Biden can tip the scales in Kyiv’s favor by backing up his statements of support with the delivery of tanks and long-range weapons. It can also hasten the fall of Putin’s regime, opening up the possibility of a democratic future for Russia and demonstrating to the world the folly of military aggression. The United States cannot let its fears get in the way of Ukraine’s hopes.
Garry Kasparov is president of the Human Rights Foundation, co-founder of the Russian Action Committee and former world chess champion. Mikhail Khodorkovsky is a co-founder of the Russian Action Committee and a former political prisoner in Russia. This article has just appeared in the original version in the magazine Foreign Affairs. © 2022 Foreign Affairs. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency.
