Revenge offensive by the Ukrainians: The West wants success – but not too much

“Break your spine!” the man yells in Russian and scolds his colleague. “Have you never cut off a head?” The video shows a Russian soldier beheading a Ukrainian man alive with a knife. “Put him in a damn bag,” another voice demands, “and send him to his commander.”

The footage, posted on April 11 by a popular Russian right-wing extremist on the social media site Telegram, sparked outrage in Ukraine. “Everyone must react to this now,” said Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the country’s president. “We will not forget anything.” Zelenskyi’s army will soon have an opportunity to take revenge.

Ukrainian counteroffensive: Only five people know the details

A Ukrainian counter-offensive is expected in the next few days or weeks. Almost nobody knows exactly where and when it will take place. Only five government officials know all the details, Oleksiy Danilov, Ukraine’s security chief, said on April 6.

But the Russian troops are armed. On April 12, the British Defense Intelligence Service reported that Russia had completed three separate defense lines along the 120-kilometer front line in Zaporizhia province in anticipation of a Ukrainian attack on Melitopol. The capture of Melitopol would help Ukraine sever Russia’s land bridge between the occupied Donbass and Crimea regions.

Ukraine’s offensive forces consist of at least a dozen brigades (some sources say as many as 18), nine of which are armed and equipped by Western allies (a brigade typically numbers several thousand men). According to US intelligence documents leaked online in early March and widely circulated in April, these nine brigades are said to have a total of 200 tanks, 800 other armored vehicles and 150 pieces of field artillery. It’s a powerful force, but it has some glaring weaknesses.

Mich Ryan: “It could also mean that we’re more likely to see a lot of smaller mini-offensives than a few big ones”

Most of their vehicles have little or no armor. The amount of artillery is relatively modest – the 21st Brigade appears to have only ten guns. Above all, the latest equipment is not concentrated in a few units, but spread across several.

Ukraine could make changes to its order of battle in response to vulnerabilities, but it cannot disband and redeploy brigades that may have spent weeks or months training and preparing together.

A problem for Ukraine is the implementation of unexpected offensives. If it concentrates its forces in a certain place, Russia could detect these preparations and strengthen its lines accordingly.

Mick Ryan, a retired Australian Major General, points out that subterfuge is key. Ukraine will have to hide troop concentrations, headquarters and logistical hubs. “It could also mean that we’re more likely to see a lot of smaller mini-offensives than a few big ones,” says Ryan, “just to confuse Russia’s target circuit and mislead them about Ukraine’s main effort.” Ukraine has experience of this before : It cleverly used last summer’s first counteroffensive in Kherson to divert attention from a surprise attack in Kharkiv to the east.

Rivers, minefields and a vast network of Russian trenches

If Ukraine can surprise tactically, the next question is whether they can break through the Russian defenses and then quickly send more forces through the gap. It will need mobile anti-aircraft systems to keep Russian planes at bay; it is not clear if she has enough of it.

There are also rivers and minefields to cross – obstacles that have swallowed entire Russian brigades in the East – as well as a vast network of Russian trenches and fortifications. “There is no military endeavor more difficult to plan, orchestrate and execute than overcoming obstacles with combined forces,” Ryan said.

In theory, precision artillery can quickly knock out prepared defenses, says Ben Barry of the IISS think tank, referring to the British use of multiple rockets to destroy bunkers in Afghanistan. However, this requires expert synchronization of artillery, infantry, and tanks so that troops advance neither too early while defenses are still intact, nor too late when Russia’s rearguard has reinforced the attack area.

Timing of the offensive is uncertain – one factor is the weather

So far, the Ukrainian army has largely conducted sequential operations — first artillery fire, then a ground advance — rather than these more sophisticated, coordinated operations, says Franz-Stefan Gady, a military analyst conducting field research in the country.

That’s partly due to rigid Soviet-style commanders and a lack of training for large-scale combined arms, he says. Improving Ukrainian command and control structures has been one of the priorities of Western experts training and advising Ukrainian generals in Germany in recent weeks.

The timing of an offensive is also uncertain. One factor is the weather. American intelligence analysts assume that the ground in eastern Ukraine will remain muddy until early May.

If you wait too long, Russia can dig in further and reload ammo

Another factor is the equipment. A third of the Western-backed brigades will not be fully equipped and trained before the end of April. The Ukrainian general staff could launch a staged attack with some brigades arriving later, Barry says, but he could also choose to “save everything for a big bang” to maximize pressure on Russia’s defenses. If you wait too long, Russia can dig in further and reload ammo.

Western officials familiar with Ukraine’s preparations are unsure how things will play out. It is important that the Ukrainian armed forces have the confidence to continue advancing. Russia’s layered defenses are designed to lure advancing columns into “death zones” covered by forward-looking artillery. If the troops panic and freeze, they could be decimated.

But the opposite is also to be feared: an unexpected collapse of Russian forces, which would enable the Ukrainian army at the Crimea estuary to seal off the peninsula, attack Russian ports and bases, and block the Sea of ​​Azov from Russian ships. Large parts of the Russian troops could also be encircled in the Cherson and Zaporizhia regions.

Serious defeat would dangerously destabilize Russia

Such a defeat is considered unlikely – a published assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) predicts only “marginal” gains for both sides for this year – but not impossible. Many Ukrainian officials would welcome such a defeat.

However, some Western experts fear that a serious defeat would dangerously destabilize Russia, making it difficult for the Kremlin to accept any subsequent negotiations. They think it would be far better if Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a semi-voluntary withdrawal, as he did in November from the west bank of the Dnieper in Kherson province.

The goal is not to defeat Putin militarily, but to convince him that regaining lost territory would require a series of politically risky mobilizations.

This won’t be easy. Putin seems to remain convinced that time is on his side. He has amplified the scale of failure at all levels, sticking to the war after his defeat on the outskirts of Kiev, and since January has squandered hundreds of thousands of mobilized recruits in a futile offensive around the city of Bakhmut.

Ukraine may not get another chance

The DIA assessment, first published by the Washington Post, said that even if Ukraine inflicted “unsustainable casualties” on Russian forces, Russia would rather mobilize again than enter into negotiations.

On April 12, Russia’s parliament passed a new law allowing the Defense Ministry to issue electronic rather than physical drafts for military service, making it easier for recruits to be drafted. Another mobilization seems inevitable.

Ukraine may not get another chance. It can sustain a counteroffensive through the spring and maybe into the summer, says Michael Kofman of think tank CNA. But it will lose ammunition and men in the process, he warns, and this could be the “high water mark” of Western aid.

The elections in America and the lack of availability of equipment will bring more and more restrictions. The coming months could herald the decisive phase of the war.

This article appeared in The Economist under the headline “Ukraine’s counter-offensive is drawing near” and was translated by Andrea Schleipen

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