“Qatar Gate”, “Marocgate”… The shock wave of the corruption scandal affecting the European Parliament continues to produce its effects. After the vice-president of the institution supposed to represent European citizens, the investigation has already led to the indictment of a series of MEPs. However, it is on the political level that the cost of this politico-financial affair is likely to be the heaviest. Faced with the mistrust of a sizeable fringe of Europeans, the members of the EU institutions must show exemplary behavior. Political confidence in the European project is at stake, and therefore the legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU, a normative and symbolic power.
The members of the institutions of the Union do not escape the general demand for the “moralisation” of political life. The sense of the general interest is no longer presumed: it is (un)shown. Within a Union which sees itself as a democratic space and a “Union of rights”, the requirement of exemplarity is controlled both by the confidence of the citizens and the legal principles of independence and transparency.
Perfectible controls
When trust is granted to a ruler whose power and legitimacy rest on the consent of the governed, he must show that he is worthy of it. This bond of trust is political and ethical in nature, and breaking it undermines the legitimacy of the representative system: to trust is to give consent. Since the end of the 1990s, the institutions of the Union have certainly begun to put in place management, control and surveillance rules. But this “deontologization” leaders proceeds first of all from the initiative, the will, the power (of self-organization) of each institution.
The “Macron Jurisprudence” and the Corruption of the Republic
Transparency mechanisms have been put in place, such as declarations of assets or interests and registers for the registration of interest groups. These systems, which thus aim to act preventively on those responsible and on their personal conduct, form a right of an ethical nature specific to each institution. But these devices can be improved. It is therefore regrettable that the procedures and disciplinary or judicial sanctions of political leaders of the Union remain exceptional, while practices in the area of lobbying and conflicts of interest remain problematic.
The spotlight is on the European Parliament, but other institutions are involved. Given its powers and responsibilities, the fantasies it crystallizes and the liabilities that already weigh on it, the Commission deserves special attention.
Four cases: Cresson, Bangemann, Barroso, Kroes
I’“Cresson affair” – the name of the former French Prime Minister who became a member of the European Commission then chaired by Jacques Santer (1995-1999) remains emblematic. His impeachment for “favouritism and personal fault” led to the Commission’s first collective resignation on 16 March 1999, the creation of a European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and a ruling by the European Court of Justice which did not hesitate to emphasize the character “irreproachable” what should be the behavior of the members of the institution that guarantees the general interest of the Union*.
Since then, even if they have not experienced a judicial epilogue, most of the questions about the exemplary nature of the members of the institutions of the Union have continued to focus on the Commissioners, and more specifically on the issue of lobbying and conflicts of interest with post-employment functions. Let us recall the case of Martin Bangemann, commissioner in charge of industry and telecommunications, who decided to resign from his post to become a member of the board of directors of the Spanish company Telefonica in 1999… The case had been brought before the Court of Justice before the Member States withdraw their action in view of the “insurance” given by Mr. Bangemann not to reveal any confidential information brought to his attention as statutory auditor. Confidence reigns within our politico-administrative elites, but is it democratically enough?
The extreme rightism of democracies
The case of the former President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, is significant. In July 2016, his appointment as advisor and non-executive chairman at the investment bank Goldman Sachs was considered by the Commission as formally in accordance with its code of conduct. However, this appointment had been qualified as “morally unacceptable” by President Sarkozy (!), while on September 6, 2016, the European Ombudsman sent an official letter to Commission President Juncker inviting him to refer an ethics committee ad hoc. The latter issued an opinion on October 26, 2016, in which it considers that Barroso has not shown “prejudicial judgment” that can be expected of a former senior official of his quality, but that he did not violate the principles of honesty and delicacy that he must observe.
If José Manuel Barroso escaped any sanction, the European Commission decided, in another ” affair “, to impose, on December 21, 2016, a reprimand on the former commissioner Neelie Kroes – already targeted in cases of conflicts of interest – for having violated Council Regulation 422/67 determining the pecuniary regime of the President and members of the Commission. She had improperly benefited from professional income in addition to her “transition allowance”. Certain omissions in its declaration of interests were also revealed during its term of office, but due to a lack of sufficient information and precise legal grounds, the Commission did not refer the case to the Court of Justice and took no other sanction.
The exemplary nature of the members of the EU institutions is not only a democratic issue: the influence of European power is based on the dissemination of standards and values of which it must prove worthy. Including when it demands a relentless fight against corruption in Ukraine, with a view to possible membership…
* ECJ, July 11, 2006, Commission v. Edith Cresson.Chronicle of the cultural battle. Every week alternating with Saïd Benmouffok.
