But where did the “Nunez method” go? At the start of the protest movement against the pension reform, the management of the maintenance of order printed by the new prefect of police of Paris, Laurent Nunez, had seemed different from that of his predecessor. Between the distancing of the police and co-management with the trade unions, the very offensive approach of Didier Lallement seemed to have been abandoned. However, since last Thursday, during the mobilizations against the use of 49.3, the tone has hardened.
More than 500 arrests took place in Paris, many of the demonstrators ending up being released several hours later, without prosecution. Videos posted online show the police no longer hesitating to come into contact with the demonstrators. On Monday, a police officer from the Motorized Violent Action Repression Brigade (Brav-M) was filmed punching a man violently. Tuesday evening, other images, this time of a man presented as a homeless man falling and then insulted by CRS, Place de la République in Paris, circulated on social networks. Another video was also released showing a policeman throwing a grenade into the air at the crowd, before it landed on a protester’s head. How to explain these images and this change of attitude of the forces of order? Answers with Mathieu Zagrodzki, researcher specializing in internal security and the police, author of What does the police ? The role of the police in society (Ed. of Dawn).
L’Express: Do the events of the last few days mark the end of what seemed to be a “Nunez method”?
Mathieu Zagrodzki: When Laurent Nunez took office, you asked me what this “Nunez method” was. At the time, I answered you that if this method existed, it also depended on external ingredients, linked to the context. Let’s take the first ingredient: the composition of the processions. Lately, the demonstrations have been made up of relatively peaceful people, often unionized, seasoned, and used to demonstrating. Or people motivated only by social mobilization. Today, we may have a few more violent elements in the demonstrations. The use of 49.3 and then the rejection of the motion of no confidence tensed the participants.
This new data means that the second ingredient of this “Nunez method” has been put in difficulty. Union order services can control orderly processions. They cannot manage – and are not made for it – sporadic undeclared demonstrations flourishing all over Paris. Here we go back to a pattern similar to that of the yellow vests. Faced with this, what was called the Nunez method – dialogue, upstream preparation and a discreet presence of the police – is put in difficulty and the old reflexes have resurfaced. The chef has changed, but the “old days” attitudes and reflexes don’t disappear overnight.
Several images showed CRS violence towards the demonstrators. Asked the next day on BFMTV about the video of the BRAV member punching a protester, Laurent Nunez explained that he needed to “contextualize, know in what context it happened”, while declaring that he had asked an administrative investigation. What do you think ?
These images are unacceptable. No matter what happens before, be it provocations, insults, police work is also framed by ethical rules. We do not have the right to throw a grenade in the air, to insult or insult the demonstrators, or even the troublemakers. The police are not a clan, they are framed by rules. Even if the possible breakers do not follow a rule. There is also the question of supervision, of a form of police burnout. Faced with situations that are quite unpredictable, there is an increase in stress, and without hierarchical supervision, without safeguards or training, this opens the door to behaviors of this type.
The police are trained in arrest, but they are necessarily dependent on events and their frequency. The demonstrations of the yellow vests took place every week. From now on, this type of event takes place every day. If the management methods and the instructions do not change, there will necessarily be police officers who are poorly or not sufficiently supervised, who will be likely to commit acts likely to violate ethics, or even legality.
At the sight of these images, the Brav-M were singled out for their management of the maintenance of order. Their presence had so far been little noticed around the processions against the pension reform…
The situation largely determines which forces are involved. Let’s take an extreme example: if there is a dispute between two people in a bar, the emergency police go to the scene. When a fight breaks out between two bands, it is rather the BAC. A hostage-taking? This will be the Raid. In the case that concerns us, it is a bit similar: during a quiet demonstration, with a union order service, the CRS will remain at a distance. If things start to move, with wanderings in small groups in streets that are difficult to access, the Brav-m are out – because they are used to this type of exercise.
The raison d’être of the Brav-m is their mobility. At the time of the yellow vests, groups wandered the streets of Paris without necessarily coordinating with each other. The police must be very mobile. The best way to do this, especially in a city with very difficult traffic, is on two wheels. That is why this unit was set up.
Do the facts mentioned point to a structural problem with these units? Why have you brought them in these last evenings?
The Brav-m are therefore on motorcycles, helmeted, with protections, fireproof clothing, which does not give them the most reassuring look. Visually, their uniform does not necessarily inspire confidence in the population. Are they particularly at fault? Some claim that the Brav-m tend to inflame certain situations. You can actually see on some images that they aren’t going too far, that’s obvious. Afterwards, are they more at fault than the intervention companies of the police headquarters? Hard to say. To get to the bottom of it, the best indicator remains the number of IGPN referrals. During the yellow vests, there were few referrals to the IGPN for the mobile gendarmes. The vast majority concerned the national police and largely the police headquarters. At this stage, this indicator is not available.
Nothing is new there: the Brav-m are criticized, scrutinized, and do not have the best image. But the police headquarters perceives them as a somewhat elite unit, very useful, even essential. They are perceived as the best response to very mobile violent groups that can move around Paris. It is a response to a complex situation, where the maintenance of order can be expressed in two ways: either the police remain at a distance and decide to intervene little, except in a very serious event; or they decide to make contact, and there is collateral damage.
