Since the first day of the invasion by Russia, he has been at the heart of the system put in place by the European Union to help Ukraine militarily. Vice-Admiral Hervé Bléjean is the current Director General of the EU General Staff, which coordinates the defense policies of the Twenty-Seven and plays a crucial role in supporting Kiev. This Breton, born in Toulon, had previously commanded the European operation to fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia. As the war enters a new phase, with a resumption of initiative by the Russians on the eastern front, he answered questions from The Expressfor his first major interview with the press since the beginning of the conflict.
L’Express: Russian forces are advancing on the eastern Ukrainian front, at the cost of significant losses. How do you estimate them today?
Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean: I mentioned 60,000 deaths in November before the Defense Commission of the National Assembly. It’s more now. According to the sources, it is sometimes double: some have even reported 10,000 Russian deaths per month in the fighting. But you have to be careful. We also see that hospitals are overwhelmed with wounded in Russia and the occupied territories. Added to this are enormous losses of equipment, especially on the Russian side. About 60% of their total stock of battle tanks was destroyed. Today, the Russian push in Bakhmout is very violent and the losses are accelerating on both sides.
The Ukrainians do not communicate the death toll either, but it is likely that they have a lower number of dead and wounded in total, even if it is very significant. It is also estimated that nearly 20,000 Ukrainian civilians were killed.
The Americans and Europeans are currently accelerating their heavy weapons deliveries with, for the first time, Western-made heavy tanks…
This makes all the more sense as we are in a freezing phase of the front lines, except on the side of Bakhmout and Soledar, and the Russians seem to be preparing a major offensive. They have for them the mobilization [au moins 300 000 hommes depuis septembre, N.D.L.R.] and the appointment of the Russian Army Chief of Staff, General Gerasimov, as commander-in-chief of the troops in the field. He is a highly respected officer, capable of planning and conducting a massive operation. The Ukrainians obviously have no interest in leaving the initiative to Russia. For them, having weapons capable of causing breaches in the Russian defense system, such as tanks, is an asset. We also see the importance of increasing their air defense capabilities to fight against drones and missiles launched by Russia. The Ukrainians manage to neutralize about 80% of them, but the remaining 20% hurt them very much.
How does the European Union help Ukraine with the delivery of military equipment?
We have set up a forum to articulate the demand for arms on the one hand and disparate offers on the other, as of February 25. This cell (called clearing house cell) brings together Europeans, Americans, British, Australians, Norwegians, and NATO. It made it possible to identify priorities, depending on the evolution of the war and Ukrainian needs. Thanks to it, we were able to quantify, from the first weekend of the conflict, what the Member States were going to provide very quickly, to determine what could be the subject of reimbursement (by what is called the “European Peace Facility”). Thanks to this solidarity mechanism, each project approved by the Twenty-Seven can give rise to aid, each country financing it by paying a share calculated on the basis of GDP (Germany 25%, France 18%, Poland 3.7%.
My responsibility is to decide what is eligible, and how much, according to criteria defined by the Member States. We don’t have an Argus catalog of second-hand military equipment, but we are in the process of building one, in a way. It is verified that equipment of the same generation delivered by two States gives rise to an identical rating. We have already reached 7 billion euros in requests for reimbursement of military equipment promised under this European system. Including bilateral deliveries, we are at 12 billion euros in military assistance from the EU, the second largest contributor behind the United States – but a very close proportion of GDP.
What else is the European Union doing to help Ukraine militarily?
As Head of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), I bring military expertise to the EU institutions. I also command a second military body that is part of the institutions of the European Union: the Military Conduct and Planning Capability (MPCC). In this capacity, I am the commander of all the non-operational external missions of the European Union. These are training courses in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and Mozambique. An additional mission was launched in November for the training of Ukrainian soldiers: the European Union Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine).
Weren’t the Europeans already training Ukrainian soldiers?
Yes, but these training courses previously offered on a bilateral basis are now under my sole command, which has made it possible to multiply the training offers and better coordinate them. These can be divided into two main categories: collective training, for example at the level of a battalion, 600 people who are taken from scratch to make them formed units, deployable on the front; and specialized training. We have two large dedicated centers, in Germany and Poland, which does not exclude training elsewhere. The target set for this mission, to train 15,000 soldiers, should be reached in April. We are going to extend beyond that, the Ukrainians are very demanding.
How could the EU do even more?
We must continue to supply equipment to Ukraine. Member States’ defense industries need to go into war mode, to be able to replenish stocks, but also to quickly produce what Ukraine needs to hold on. This is undoubtedly the biggest challenge today. Maintaining training is not too complicated, we can continue as long as the need arises (provided that the mission can be financed over time). And then tomorrow, in a peaceful Ukraine, I hope, and which will have to be rebuilt, our mission will be able to continue to support the modernization of the Ukrainian army. In the meantime, we must maintain the pace of support for Ukraine, in this war of attrition where the first to lack both equipment and men will be in a difficult position.
What lessons do you draw from this war?
Russian mentalities have not modernized as quickly as their equipment. We are still on a “Second World War model”. We hardly saw any air campaign on their part and we have the impression of a kind of improvisation in the rather surprising planning. For their part, the Ukrainians were able to establish different scenarios and they rolled out their plan. They had encouraged us to reflect before the beginning of the conflict by saying to us: “we know that you cannot deploy troops, but if we are massively attacked, how can you support us?” This allowed us to react quickly from the first days of the conflict, not to procrastinate. A well-understood and well-thought-out alliance allows rapid decision-making, which has not been the strong point of the European Union until now. If we had waited a month before making any decision, I don’t think Ukraine would exist in its current form.
How are the tasks divided between the EU and NATO?
NATO is invited to our meetings and vice versa, but the coordination is led by the United States. The Atlantic Alliance as an organization does not provide aid to Ukraine, but its individual members do. NATO, since the invasion, has avoided giving rise to accusations of co-belligerence. In the context of the war in Ukraine, it perfectly played its mission of collective defense of its members, in particular by strengthening military deployments on its eastern flank. [comme l’envoi de soldats français en Roumanie, N.D.L.R.]. In terms of defence, the European Union does not have a vocation, like NATO, for collective defense within its borders, but for actions outside, such as when it trains Ukrainian soldiers.
Before the war, the EU and NATO were criticized for sometimes stepping on each other’s toes…
I have always said that it was a false debate, this idea that the means devoted to the EU would deprive NATO, and vice versa. We do not share military means between the EU, NATO and purely national systems. In any case, the context of the war in Ukraine clarified things, by highlighting, not the competition, but the complementarity of the two organisations. Together they form an extremely credible, dissuasive and actionable system. As proof, two EU member countries, Sweden and Finland, identified as neutral until now, have asked to join NATO.
Who are your daily interlocutors on the side of the Member States?
These are mainly the military representatives of the Member States, in Brussels, within the Military Committee of the European Union. They often represent their general staff to the EU and NATO, and most of the time hold the rank of lieutenant general. We also have formats bringing together the Chiefs of Defense Staff directly, as at NATO. I also have the opportunity to address the Ambassadors of the Political and Security Committee, even the Ministers of Defense, during the Councils.
Should the European Union’s general staff gain in importance?
The EU defense and diplomacy roadmap, the strategic compass, foresees that by 2025 the MPCC will be able to command a rapid deployment outside, up to 5,000 troops , including in a hostile environment. The EUMS must also be modernised.
He is increasingly in demand in his role of expertise, in capability development and other work mentioned in the strategic compass, in intelligence too: I have a military intelligence department inside the office, receptacle from those of the Member States.
Are you going to carry out these projects?
This will be above all the role of my successor, since I am leaving my post in June. This EU General Staff is only 21 years old, which is quite young for an organization which did not have military chromosomes in its DNA when it was created. When NATO was already half a century old, the launch of this headquarters was not easy, which explains this cautious approach of the European Union in terms of defence. But this area has grown, with the European Defense Fund, on the Commission side, the European Peace Facility and also the annual coordinated defense review, which makes it possible to take stock of the situation. But we are at the limit on the workload, and the EU now needs a staff to match the ambitions of the strategic compass. We are only 200 people. NATO’s command structure has 12,000 people…
